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THE QUEUING THEORETIC APPROACH TO GROUNDWATER
MANAGEMENT
Amitraj eet A. Batabyal

ABSTRACT

In this paper I propose and develop a new framework for modeling groundwater management

issues. Specifically, I apply the methods of queuing theory-for the first time, to the best of my
knowledge-to model a groundwater management problem from a long-run perspective.

I

characterize two simple management regimes as two different kinds of queues and then show how
to pose a manager's decision problem as an optimization problem using queuing theoretic techniques.
I solve for certain fundamental quantities, such as the expected system size, and then discuss the
economic meaning and relevance of the queuing concepts being used. I close by discussing possible
extensions to my basic models.
Key words: groundwater, management, stochastic, queuing, theory
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THE QUElliNG THEORETIC APPROACH TO GROUNDWATER
MANAGEMENT

1. Introduction

When economists have studied the question of groundwater management, they have typically cast the
problem in a deterministic, control theoretic framework. Brown and McGuire (1967), Burt (1967), Burt and
Cummings (1977), and Provencher and Burt (1993) have all analyzed different aspects of the groundwater
management problem within this kind of control theoretic framework. While this framework has yielded many
valuable insights, in this schema, analysts have not been able to satisfactorily model the twin phenomena of

uncertain dynamic demand and uncertain dynamic supply. Given this situation, in this paper I propose and
analyze a new framework for modeling the question of groundwater management. This framework uses the
techniques of queuing theory. There are two main advantages to this method as compared to the deterministic,
control theoretic framework. First, I am able to model the twin phenomena of uncertain dynamic demand and
uncertain dynamic supply effectively. Second, I am able to treat the inherently stochastic nature of the problem
explicitly and not as something that is relevant but incidental to the problem owing to modeling difficulties.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I discuss the main attributes of groundwater
briefly and then proceed to pose a groundwater management problem in a queuing context. I then explain the
two kinds of queues that I propose to study. In section 3, I develop the two queuing models and then pose the
management problem mentioned above as a simple optimization problem involving the choice of two control
variables. Finally, in section 4, I present my salient fmdings, and I discuss some of the many directions in which
my basic models may be extended.
To clarify any potential confusion, let me state at the outset that my problem is not the dam problem
which has been analyzed by queuing theorists such as Moran (1959) and Prabhu (1965) at some length. First,
I am not interested in determining how much water should be stored by a groundwater manager. The issue of
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storage is not germane to my problem. My problem is to determine how much water to supply and at what rate
in some specified time period. Second, I am not interested in determining the optimal size of a dam; my
secondary problem is to determine the optimal quota on water use within the aforementioned time period. Third,
I am interested in the management problem, inter alia, due to the common property nature of groundwater use
and the corresponding inefficiencies arising from unregulated use (see Dasgupta 1982, Chapter 6). As such, my
principal motivation for studying this problem is not to make water supply more predictable in some statistically
known manner.

2. Preliminaries

Water occurs as a stock and as a flow. Surface water, i.e., the flows in lakes, rivers, etc., is typically the
result of runoffs from precipitation and/or snowpack melt; both of these physical processes are stochastic. On
the other hand, groundwater exists in aquifers as a stock subject to stochastic recharge. This suggests why the
supply of groundwater is uncertain. The demand uncertainty associated with groundwater is principally a
function of intertemporal market and climatic conditions. Depending on these conditions, the demand for
groundwater will exhibit temporal fluctuations. In a year with good rainfall and, hence, plentiful supplies of
surface water, the demand for groundwater will typically be less than in time periods in which there is a drought.
In these latter times, the demand for groundwater will increase. From a management perspective, what is
f

important is that the demand for groundwater is stochastic.
An additional feature characterizing and providing a rationale for the regulation of groundwater is the

fact that groundwater is a res communes, or a common property resource. That is, there are typically no welldeveloped property rights to the aquifers containing groundwater. Even in a developed country like the USA,
different states have a loose patchwork of rules governing the use of groundwater. For instance, in Texas, the
common law system regulates groundwater use; in New Mexico, groundwater rights are defined by the prior
appropriation doctrine. In California, a mixed bag of riparian rights and rights according to the prior
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appropriation doctrine govern groundwater use. As a result, in the absence of regulation, each individual water
user, in isolation, finds it profitable to exploit the aquifer until the price received from selling (using) the water
obtained from the aquifer equals the average cost of obtaining the water.1 At this point of resource use, all
economic rents from the aquifer are dissipated and the total revenues from the use of groundwater equal the total
cost of pumping the groundwater from the aquifer. The inefficiencies associated with this rent dissipation are
well understood (see Dasgupta 1982, Chapter 6); hence, I shall not pursue this issue any further. A related
problem concerns the intertemporal misallocation of pumping due to the res communes nature of aquifers (Brown

1974).
The dynamic and stochastic features of groundwater use make the management problem amenable to
analysis via queuing theoretic methods. By management, I am referring to a situation in which a social planner
(hereafter manager) who is assigned property rights to an aquifer solves an optimization problem. In solving this
problem, the manager explicitly takes into account the social benefit and the social cost stemming from the
provision and use of groundwater. In my models, the manager's optimization problem involves the maximization
of the difference between monetary inflows (benefit) and monetary outflows (cost) from the provision and use
of groundwater. In what follows, I shall refer to this difference as the residual benefit.
The uncertain demand for water over time is modeled by an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
stochastic arrival process of water users (hereafter users). The uncertain supply of water is modeled by an i.i.d.
/

stochastic supply process of the water manager. The stochastic processes representing demand and supply are
assumed to be independent of each other. More specifically, there is a single manager in charge of dispensing
groundwater from an aquifer to the different users who pay a fee for the water that they receive. The users arrive
at some central water-dispensing facility in accordance with some stochastic process with finite mean and form

IThis is yet another manifestation of the so-called Isolation Paradox. See Sen (1967) for a discussion.
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a queue. If the manager is idle, then the first user to arrive proceeds to obtain hislher water,2 otherwise the user
waits in queue. Users arrive one at a time and are served one at a time in order of arrival. In the two cases that
I analyze, I shall assume that the arrival process of the users is Poisson and that this fact is known to the manager.
As a result, the interarrival times are exponentially distributed and the distribution of interarrival times has the
Markovian property of being memoryless. I will denote its distribution function by M(-), its mean by 1/y, and
its rate by y. I shall model the supply tmcertainty in two ways. In the first case I shall assume that the time taken
by the manager in supplying water can be represented by an exponential distribution. In the second case, I shall
assume that the manager's time to supply water is represented by some arbitrary distribution whose cumulative
distribution function is G(-). That is, the supply times, denoted by S, have a cumulative distribution function
denoted by G(-). In both cases-Markovian in the first and general in the second-I assume that the mean of
the cumulative distribution function is finite; I denote this mean by lIE.
The manager's task is to choose the queue capacity, i.e., the number of people he/she will supply water
to in a specified time period and the rate at which he/she fills requests for water so as to maximize the residual
benefit arising from the provision and use of groundwater. In economic parlance, the manager chooses a quota
on water allocation in a certain time period and the rate at which he/she will distribute the available supply of
water. In the language of queuing theory, I am studying, in turn, the MIMII and the WG/l queues, both with
finite capacity. In this three-letter designation, the first letter refers to the fact that the interarrival times of the
;

users has the Markovian property. The second letter, M and G, respectively, refers to the fact that the manager's
supply times distribution has the Markovian property in the first case, whereas this distribution is general in the
second case. Finally, the number 1 refers to the fact that there is a single groundwater manager.
I now proceed to a formal discussion of the queuing theoretic approach to the aforementioned water
management problem.

2This does not have to involve actual physical collection. Conceptually. obtaining could also mean arranging to
have a certain quantity of water released by way of pipelines or canals.
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3. The Analytical Framework

3a. The Water Management Regime as a M1M11
Queue with Finite Capacity
Since my analysis is being conducted from a long-run perspective, I first have to determine the stationary
probabilities for this type of queue. I now introduce three sets of probabilities that I shall work with. If X(tJ
denotes the number of water users in the queuing system at an arbitrary time t, then let
Pk

==

(1)

limt..... Pr {X(t) - k}

be the long-run probability that there are exactly k users in the system. Let {ak: k ~ o} be the proportion of users
who find k in the system when they arrive. Finally, let {dk : k

~

o} be the proportion of users who leave behind

kusers in the system when they depart. It is important to note that P k can be interpreted as the proportion of time .
that the system contains exactly k users. For my purposes, the relevant stationary probabilities are the (P,).
However, since it will not be possible to obtain the (P,) directly in section 3b, I shall exploit some well-known
relationships between the (a,), (d,), and (P,) to obtain the (P,). Since I will be working with fmite capacity
queues, let me denote the capacity of the queue by K. Thus, the state space of the queue can be indexed by k,
where k = 0, ... ,K. That is, when there are K users in the system, the manager will not provide water to any
more users in a certain time period. K is, in fact, one of two choice variables for the manager. Later I will solve
for the K which maximizes the residual benefit arising from the use of water.
To determine the (PJ, I shall follow Ross (1985) and solve a set of balance equations. These equations
make use of the basic principle that the rate at which the queue enters state k equals the rate at which it leaves
state k. Using this rate equality principle, the rate at which the stochastic process (of arriving users) leaves state

omust equal the rate at which the stochastic arrival process enters state O.

So, for state 0, I have
(2)

where y and E are the parameters of the two exponential distributions, as discussed in section 2. Similarly, for
any state k, k

=

1 , ... , K - 1, I get
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(3)
Finally, for state K, the rate equality principle gives me the following balance equation

(4)
The equation for state K requires some explanation Note that state K can be left by means of a departure because
once the system is in state K, no other users can enter the system. Analogously, state K can be entered only from
state K-J, since there is no state K +1.
I now solve (2)-(4) in terms of the stationary probability that the manager is idle, i.e., in terms of Po.
I get

PI - (y/e)P o '

P2

•

PK

(y Ie )2 Po' . . . ,
•

(5)

(y/efp o .

k-K

I can now use the fact that E Pie - 1 to solve for Po explicitly. I get
k-O

P _ { l-(y/e) }.
o
1 _ (y Ie f+l

(6)

Using (5) and (6) I get

Pk

- [( y Ie

l{ 1 - (y Ie)}

1 - (y Ie

f+l

l'

k _ 0, ... ,K .

(7)

This accomplishes my first task. The stationary probabilities for the water management regime which I have
modeled as aK stateMIMIJ queue are given by (7).
I can now pose the manager's optimization problem. In my model, the manager's task is (a) to choose
the number of users who will be supplied water during some time period and (b) to choose the rate at which
he/she will supply water to the different users. The rate at which users arrive to demand water in a certain time
period-which I take to be a month-is given by Int[y(l - PJ] where Int[-] denotes the integer part of the term
inside the square brackets. Further, if the i th user demands Xj units of water for which he/she pays aj = a/x)
i-

dollars, then the manager's monetary inflows per month equal y (1- P K)

IPIt(y(I-P.(')]

E
i-I

ai

•

Two additional
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interpretations are possible for the a j • First, they can be viewed as each individual groundwater user's tax arising
from the use of groundwater. Second, the a j can also be viewed as a net payment, i.e., a payment which includes
a return for groundwater use. I assume that the manager incurs fixed costs of $F to supply water and that he/she
incurs variable costs which are a function of the rate at which he/she chooses to supply water and the number of
users to whom he/she supplies water. I denote this variable cost function by C

=

C(E, K). The manager's

objective is to maximize the total residual benefit per month arising from the provision of water, which I assume
to be the difference between monetary inflows (benefit) and outflows (cost) as described above. Thus, the
manager solves
i .I1It(y(1- Pr)]
maxE,Kv(I-PK )

~

(8)

ai(xi)-C(e,K)-F.

i .1

(9)

and
(10)

Equation (9) says that the weighted marginal cost of providing water per month (the RHS of the equation) must
equal the weighted total sum of monetmy payments for water use. Similarly, (10) says that the weighted marginal
cost-withrespecttoK-<>fprovidingwater (the RHS of the equation) must be set equal to a different weighted
)

sum of the total monetmy payments. The weights themselves are functions of the parameters of the two different
exponential distributions. The solutions to (9) and (10) give us the optimal values of the choice variables

E

and

K Since equations like (9) and (10) cannot, in general, be solved analytically, one will have to resort to numerical
methods in order to obtain the optimal E and K.
Two quantities which have a bearing on the efficiency of the management function and, hence, are of
considerable interest to the manager are the average number of groundwater users in the system, i.e., the expected

3

1 assume that the second-order conditions are satisfied.
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system size (which I shall denote by L) and the average number of groundwater users waiting in queue or the
expected queue size (which I shall denote by LQ)' The quantitiesL andLQ are useful for planning purposes. They
provide the manager with summary statistics about the water users. Since the manager is a social planner vested
with property rights to the aquifer, he/she will want to alter hislher choice variables over time if, for instance, the
average number of users being supplied water is deemed to be too few.
k-K

Now L • E kP". For the K

state~l

queue, this simplifies to

k-O

L • . .:.,.Y.......
[ I_+_K--:(,-=-Y_,€...:,.f_+_l---:(,--K_+---:1):.. .=. (. :. -Y'_€...;.,f-.L1
( € -

The expected queue size, L Q

• Ytl W Q •

time a user spends waiting in queue =

where

Ytl

Y ) [1 - ( Y, €

f+ 1 1

(11)

= expected arrival rate of users = Y (1 - P K) and WQ = expected

[L' {Y(1 - PK)} - { I' €} ]

.

Thus, I get

(12)

wherePKis given by (7) andL is given by (11).
Thus far, I have characterized a groundwater management regime as aMlM/J queue with fInite capacity.
In democratic polities, society can choose how to use the maximized residual benefit. It can be used to maintain

water supply facilities so as to make the management regime self-financing. It can be used to pay for water
imports in times of emergency such as a drought. If one were to view the ai as net payments by users, then some
of this benefit could be returned to the individual groundwater users. Finally, if society desires that the manager
break even financially, then the manager's problem becomes one of choosing € and K so as to equate monetary
inflows (benefIts) and outflows (costs).
I now discuss an alternate queuing theoretic characterization of a groundwater management regime.
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3b. The Water Management Regime as a MlG/1
Queue with Finite Capacity
I now model the water management regime as a MlG/1 queue with fInite capacity. Before obtaining the
stationary probabilities for the K state MlG/l queue, I fIrst have to obtain the stationary probabilities for the

MlG/l queue with a countable state space. Because the manager's supply time distribution is arbitrary for this
queue, the methods cannot be applied here that were employed in section 3a to obtain the stationarY probabilities
for (X(t): f

~

OJ whereX(t) denotes the number of users in the system at time f. In fact, (X(t): f

~

OJ is not a

discrete time Markov chain. As is usually done in this case, I proceed by analyzing the embedded Markov chain

(X(n): n '"'"' 1, 2, . . .} where X(n) refers to the number of users left behind by the nth departure from the system
(see Ross 1983, pp. 100-112). LetP = [Pi) denote the chain's transition probability matrix and let the one-step
transition probabilities be4
-yt(

P ij

..

,/-i+l

Jo e U - yi t 1)1

d G ( t), j

~ i-I, i ~ 1

(13)

1-

where G(.) is the distribution function of the manager's supply times. If I let

trn

= Pr{n arrivals during a supply

time S = fj, then I get
e

-yt(

yt
nl

)JI

dG(t).

(14)

In order to obtain the stationary probabilities for the chain {X(n): n = 1, 2, ... }, I shall assume that
t, - E n 1t n < 1 . That is, the mean number of arrivals in a supply time period is assumed to be less than
n-l

unity. This assumption ensures the ergodicity of the chain and hence the existence of the stationary probabilities.
To determine the stationary probabilities {d k}, I need to solve the stationary equations. These are
j-i .. l

d t - d01t i

~
1- 1

dj 1t i _j .. 1 ,

i - 0, 1,2, . . .

(15)

To solve the above set of equations, I shall use probability-generating functions as in Ross (1983, pp. 111-112).
To this end, let

41 use the Stieltj es integral to avoid problems arising from the potential nonexistence of the density function.

10
D(z) - 11 diz i ,

~ 1

Izl

(16)

i-O

and let
ll(z) - 11 1t i Z I

(17)

.

i-0

Multiplying the LHS and the RHS of (15) by z i , summing over i, and then solving for D(z) yields
d O(I-z)ll(z)
D(z) - - - - - ll(z)-z

(18)

Equation (18) can be further simplified by using L'Hopital's rule, noting that II(1) = 1 and that

II' (1) = () = yE[supply time] = y(1/e), where E[-J is the expectation operator. Performing these simplifications,
I get do = 1 - () and
D (z) _ (1 - ~)(1 - z)ll(z)
ll(z) - z

(19)

Equation (19) is as far as I can go in obtaining the stationary probabilities of the embedded Markov chain
{X(n): n

=

I, 2, ... }. So far, I have obtained the {dk } for the countable state Markov chain. However, I am

actually interested in obtaining the {dk } for the K state embedded chain. I now proceed to obtain these
probabilities.
I frrst have to truncate the state space to k = 0 . . . , K - 1 states. This truncation necessitates a
modification of the relevant stationary equations. These equations can now be written as
j-i+ 1

d.r - d o1t·r.. .11 d.1t.
' 1' i-O, 1, . . . ,K-2
J r-J+
J-I
1I-K-2

di

-

1 - do

11 1t 11
11-0

j-K

-

11 dj

j-I

(20)

1I-K-j-I

11

1t 11' i - K - 1

11-0

The solution to these K equations will give us the {dk } for the K state chain. To obtain the solution, I shall
proceed heuristically. 5 Inspecting (15) and (20), I conjecture that the stationary probabilities for the K state

5See Cohen (1982, pp. 570-572) for an alternate and considerably more rigorous approach to the solution.

11
embedded Markov chain must be proportional to the stationary probabilities for the countable state Markov chain
which I now denote by {a:}. That is,

(21)
where L is the constant of proportionality. To verify that my conjecture is true, I first need to determine L. To
k·X'.l

obtain L I shall use the fact that 1 - L

~

k.X'.l

d; -

~o

~

k.X'-l

d k' This tells me that L - 1 I ~

~o

d;. From this I

~o

conclude that the stationary probabilities for the K state Markov chain are given by
dOO
d k - k.X'_lk
~
k.O

d;

~

(22)

k - 0, 1 , . . . , K - 1

I have now solved for the {dk } , i.e., the proportion of users leaving behind k in the system when they depart the

system. However, we are really interested in the {Pk }. To obtain the {Pk }, I shall first solve for the {ak }. Now,
in any queuing system in which users arrive one at a time and are supplied water one at a time,

a k - d k' k ~ 0

(Ross 1985, p. 308). This property holds in the case that I have been studying. Further, by the PASTA property
(see Wolff 1989, pp. 293-297), a k
ak -

-

Pk

Hence, to obtain the {Pk

•

},

it suffices to find the {ak

}.

In my case,

d k' except that to obtain the {ak }, I have to expand the state space to include the K state. This can be done

easily. First,notethatdt =Pr{an arrivalfinds kusers occupying the system/arrival does join the queue} and,

ak - P k -

Finally, to fmd

aX' - PX' ~

e (1 - do) - y (1 -

aX')

(1 - a X' ) d k' k - 0 ~ . . . ~ K - 1 .

(23)

I use the rate equality principle alluded to in the derivation of (2)-(4). I have

and, hence,
(y/e)-1

+

do

aX'-PX'- - - - -

y/e

(24)

Also, using (24), then (23) can be simplified to
(1 - do)d k
ak=P k = - - -

y/e

Thus, the required stationary probabilities for the K stateMlGlj queue are given by (24) and (25).

(25)
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I am now in a position to discuss the manager's optimization problem. Reasoning analogous to that
employed in section 3a reveals that the manager's optimization problem is given by (8). The relevant first-order
necessary conditions for an interior maximum are6
t-lni[y(I-Pr)]
(

~

)

at

,-I

[{k_X-l J2 k-X-l
{k-X-l}
{k_X_l} 1
11 d; - 11 d; + eo 11 d; loe - yo 11 d; loe k-O
k-O
k-O
k-O

{ oC(o)/oe}

{k_X-l J2
11 d;
k-O

(26)

and
i_lni[Y(I-Pr)]}
[ {

i:l

at

(y - e)

1[{k_X-l
} 1
0 ?:o d; 10K ~

{oC(o)/oK} .

(27)

Equation (26) tells us that optimality requires the manager to set the weighted marginal cost of supplying water
(the RHS of the equation) equal to the weighted sum of total monetary inflows. Further, (27) tells us that the
marginal cost of supplying water (the RHS of the equation) should be set equal to a different weighted sum of
monetary inflows. Alternately, the weighted sum of total monetary inflows can also be interpreted as the marginal
revenue from water use. The optimal € and K are defmed by (26) and (27) implicitly. As in section 3a, (26) and
27) will typically have to be solved numerically to obtain the desired € and K.
To obtain the expected system size, L, and the expected queue size, L Q,7 for the K state MlG/1 queue,
I will follow a slightly different route. As is well known, L - Yaw. where W is the expected time that a water
user spends in the system.

Ya - Y (1 - P x), as in section 3a.

W - WQ + (11 e 1. Some algebra reveals that WQ
p. 337). Finally, L Q

•

YaW Q

•

-

{Y e (1

W can be computed from the relation

- P x)E[S

21) I { 2[ e - Y(1 - P x)]}

(see Ross 1985,

Using these relationships, I get

(28)

and

6r assume that the second-order conditions are satisfied.
7These quantities were defmed in section 3 a.
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(29)

where S denotes a supply time andPKis given by (24).

In addition to the ways suggested in section 3a of apportioning the residual benefit arising from the
provision of groundwater, this benefit can be used for other purposes as well. This could include activities such
as the fmancing of a monetary scheme which would reward water conservation during times of emergency.

4. Conclusions and Potential Extensions

In this paper I have proposed and analyzed a new framework for modeling a groundwater management

problem. This framework applies the techniques of queuing theory. Specifically, I characterized two simple
water management regimes as two different kinds of queues. I then went on to show how the manager could
choose a quota on water allocation and the rate at which he/she would supply water in a certain time period so
as to maximize the residual benefit arising from the provision and use of groundwater.
The basic models discussed in this paper may be extended in many directions. In what follows, I suggest
three possible extensions. One can make the models richer by considering bulk arrivals and/or bulk supply.
While this would invalidate the ak = dk result, the explicit incorporation of bulk arrivals and/or bulk supply will
permit one to analyze management regimes more general than the ones that I have analyzed. A second line of
extension would;be to consider cases where the arrival process is arbitrary and the supply times process is either
deterministic or some known stochastic process. This kind of setting would be in the spirit of the principal/agent
paradigm of information economics. 8 In this paradigm, the principal (my manager) is generally assumed to know
the characteristics afIectingthe discharge ofhislher functions with certainty. However, the principal is assumed

to know the characteristics of the agents (my users) only imperfectly. Finally, the use of queue networks would
permit the analysis of interactions such as those between agricultural and nonagricultural uses of groundwater.

8See Kreps (1989, Chapters 16 and 17) for an informative discussion of the principal/agent paradigm.
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